Covert Contact 115: Election Threats and Disrupting Chinese Espionage
William Tucker and I discuss reported Russian, Chinese, and Iranian threats to the 2020 campaigns and efforts to disrupt Chinese intelligence collection at U.S. universities. We examine election confidence, visa revocations, research security, and clearer institutional communication.
William Tucker joins me to discuss foreign threats to the 2020 presidential election and the expanding effort to disrupt Chinese intelligence collection at American universities. We start with Microsoft's reporting on Russian, Chinese, and Iranian activity targeting people and organizations connected to the presidential campaigns. The conversation puts those reports in the longer history of foreign influence and asks how much we can infer about an adversary's intentions from the activity investigators happen to detect.
We discuss the limits of framing election interference only around which candidate a foreign government might prefer. Undermining confidence in institutions and the election process can serve an adversary's interests regardless of the immediate target. Partisan arguments can obscure that broader problem and make it harder to have a useful discussion about preparation. We also look at the role of technology companies, whose platforms are being targeted and whose security teams are often directly involved in identifying and countering the activity.
The second half turns to the U.S. government's revocation of more than 1,000 visas for Chinese nationals, including graduate students and researchers identified as security risks. We discuss the use of disruption when an espionage prosecution may be difficult, concerns about undisclosed military affiliations and research relationships, and the costs universities can face when they fail to address those risks. Research programs, funding, intellectual property, and the opportunities available to legitimate students and researchers can all be affected.
We also examine the gap between academic institutions and the agencies asking them to take these threats seriously. That includes questions about media coverage, how investigations begin, and how clearly the government explains its actions. We argue for closer attention to concerning behavior and better communication about what institutions should look for and how they should respond.
We close with practical options for universities and other organizations: establish relationships before a crisis, seek guidance from the FBI, and use qualified outside security advice when appropriate. Sustained outreach and earlier attention to problems can help organizations protect their work and reduce the disruption that follows when concerns are left unresolved.