Covert Contact 117: Chinese Espionage Operations

This week's conversation with William Tucker proved especially fascinating as we explored multiple dimensions of Chinese intelligence operations. One particularly disturbing case involved an NYPD officer caught acting as an agent for China, monitoring the Tibetan community and attempting to develop intelligence sources.

Many expressed surprise that Chinese intelligence would target a local police officer, but when you think about it strategically, it makes perfect sense. NYPD stands alone among police forces in its connection to the U.S. intelligence community and international reach. After 9/11, NYPD developed extensive foreign relationships, often being the first foreign law enforcement agency on scene for major incidents abroad. Their integration with federal agencies makes them a valuable intelligence target.

This officer wasn't just monitoring the Tibetan community (despite being ethnically Tibetan himself) but was also serving as an access agent – setting up meetings between his Chinese handlers and higher-ups in law enforcement. The personal risk to community members who interacted with him cannot be understated. Beyond any institutional damage, there's significant human cost when communities discover they've been infiltrated by someone they trusted.

This case reminds us that espionage threats are rarely isolated incidents. Every discovery provides an opportunity for other agencies to examine their own security practices, especially those operating in cities with significant diaspora communities or diplomatic presence. San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Houston immediately come to mind as potential hotspots for similar activity.

Universities Making Progress Against Espionage

On a more encouraging note, FBI Director Christopher Wray announced significant progress in getting universities to cooperate on countering Chinese espionage activities on campuses. This development has been years in the making – roughly a decade ago, an FBI counterintelligence director tried to warn universities about these threats and was essentially told to "go pound sand."

This cooperation will help protect not just institutional research but also students themselves. China has unfortunately targeted ethnic Chinese students studying abroad, attempting to recruit them as agents. This creates an additional layer of victimization, as these students didn't come to America with any intention of espionage. The new protective measures should help shut down that avenue of exploitation.

One of the challenges in this area is balancing vigilance without painting innocent people with a broad brush. When espionage happens at scale, there's a risk of creating something akin to a witch hunt. That's why behavior-focused security programs are essential – they avoid tunnel vision and potential discrimination while still protecting valuable research and individuals.

European Think Tank Leader Under Investigation

Across the Atlantic, another case caught my attention. Fraser Cameron, former MI6 officer and current head of the EU-Asia Centre think tank, is under investigation for allegedly passing EU information to Chinese spies posing as journalists. Both British MI6 and Belgian counterintelligence are involved in the investigation.

Cameron has called the allegations "absurd," noting he's been out of MI6 for nearly 30 years and doesn't have access to sensitive information. As a think tank director, he naturally speaks with many people, including journalists.

This case highlights how intelligence collection doesn't always require direct access to classified material. People with broad networks and connections can inadvertently share information that, while not technically classified, isn't meant for public consumption. It's also possible Cameron is just one part of a larger operation, with authorities more interested in the network of Chinese agents posing as reporters.

The timing aligns with Brexit-related trade negotiations, with China naturally seeking insights into vulnerabilities and negotiating positions. This represents standard intelligence collection rather than anything particularly nefarious – everyone wants an edge in major negotiations.

Historical Perspective on Intelligence Operations

As William and I discussed the unprecedented scale of current Chinese espionage activities, our conversation took an interesting historical turn. While today's volume seems unique, intelligence operations have deep historical roots. The Venetian Secret Service during the Middle Ages was remarkably active, with agents placed throughout known regions. Similarly, the diplomatic negotiations during the Thirty Years' War involved extensive intelligence activities as parties sought advantages.

This historical perspective reminds us that human nature hasn't changed. The fundamental tactics and tradecraft of intelligence, despite technological advances, remain rooted in human behavior. For those interested in entering the intelligence field, studying this history provides invaluable insights that complement more recent examples from the Cold War era.

There's tremendous instructive material available, from CIA's online resources to Department of Justice indictments. These primary sources offer detailed insights into how intelligence operations function, often providing information more accurate than media reporting, which necessarily focuses on highlights rather than technical details.

Intelligence work is endlessly complex, combining human factors with rapidly evolving technology. The learning never ends – which makes this field simultaneously challenging and deeply rewarding.

I'm constantly reminded that despite high-tech developments, intelligence remains fundamentally about humans seeking advantages, leveraging weaknesses, and navigating complex relationships. Whether we're examining cases from medieval Venice or modern New York City, the underlying principles remain remarkably consistent.